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Preamble 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law. The dissertation deals 
particularly, with the concept of data subject consent in the General Data Protection 
Regulation by tracking the changes between the previous legal regime and the 
Regulation. In other words, starting with the significance of subject’s consent in the 
frame of data protection as a legitimate ground for data processing, although the 
GDPR is based on the previous legal framework, it intends to tighten and strengthen 
the role of consent by establishing more transparency and simple information policies 
and therefore, in this way, it gives the control to the data subject. More specifically, it 
adds criteria and conditions in order to ensure the provision of consent with regard to 
the freedom of choice and the total awareness of the subject when he gives his 
consent, it puts particular emphasis on strengthening child protection and it also 
extends the right to information to a more general principle of transparency. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to what has been done so far and, finally, whether 
the Regulation intervenes on these points by making some changes as an evolutionary 
law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This dissertation could not have been finished without the help and support of my 
supervisor professor, the academic staff, the academic library of International 
Hellenic University, and my family. It is my great pleasure to acknowledge people 
who have given me guidance, help and support and who have faith in me. 
First of all , I would like to express my sincere appreciation and deepest gratitude to 
my supervisor professor and Scientific Director Professor Dr Athanasios Kaissis for 
providing me with the opportunity to attend the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution Program , which enabled me to 
acquire valuable knowledge on international commercial law , economics and ADR . I 
would like to thank him for his extremely valuable guidance and support in order to 
complete this dissertation. 
Similarly, I would like to thank Dr Komnios Komninos for his also extremely 
valuable guidance and suggestions, which were very helpful and precious to me in 
order to finish this dissertation. 
Special thanks should be given to the academic library of International Hellenic 
University, which provided me with variety of resources, the library staff, the 
academic staff and assistants in general, who were always willing to help me and 
guide me through my research. 
Also, I would like to thank particularly , a very beloved person , who is important to 
my life , who I consider to be my family , who urges me to reach my goals , who tells 
me to “fly as high as I can” , and who encouraged and inspired me to undertake and 
complete this particular dissertation . 
Finally , I would like to thank my parents , my brother and my daughter , who have 
faith in me and always support and encourage me to overcome myself . 
Maria Apostolina 
February 2018 
 
 
7 
 
I. Introduction 
Privacy is globally recognized as a personal, individual right. The philosophy of 
privacy in Europe is elevated as a fundamental right. The evolution of new computer 
technologies focused on the right to information privacy which concerns the 
protection of personal information infringement by others and this right is defined by 
Europeans in terms of “personal data”. Personal data can be any kind of information 
provided and related to a person
1
. Consequently, a proactive approach to protecting 
personal privacy has been taken by the European Union and its Member States
2
. The 
European legislator, recognizes several reasons in order to protect the processing and 
the free movement of personal data on legitimate grounds particularly, one of which is 
the consent of the data subject. In 2010, in Europe, the concept of data subject consent 
was in the center of a debate within the framework of the review of the data 
protection. Therefore , in January 2012 , after three intense years, the European 
Commission in order to reform the data protection framework of the European Union, 
proposed the replacement of the Data Protection Directive with a Regulation , because 
it is considered that more legal certainty and coherence will be provided by a 
Regulation compared to a Directive
3
.Consequently , in 25 May 2018 the General  
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 679/2016/EE is put into implementation
4
 and 
particularly, by clarifying the conditions of the notion of the consent the data subject 
obtains more significant and activated role inter alia through the strengthening of the 
right of consent and by converting this right  to a fundamental source of legitimization 
of the processing
5
. This particular research addresses the notion of data subject 
consent in the GDPR by tracking the changes between the previous legal regime and 
                                                          
1 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p 41 
2 Lasprogata G., King N., Pillay S., “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying 
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy Legislation 
in the European Union, United States and Canada”, Stanford Technology Law Review 4 (2004), pp7-
11 
3 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 1-3 
4 Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016/EU”, Sakoulas 
Publications, 2017 (in Greek), pp 10,17 
5 Mitrou L.,“The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 71 
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the Regulation. More specifically, it will be mentioned the provisions of GDPR on the 
concept of  i)”freely given”, ii) specific, iii) informed, iv) unambiguous and v) explicit 
consent in conjunction with relative parameters, furthermore, the legal capacity of 
data subject in order to consent, the unlawfulness of the processing despite the 
existence of consent involving some exceptions to the rule of consent’s necessity, 
moreover, the right of data subject to withdraw his or her consent and finally, the right 
to erasure or “to be forgotten” and the burden of proof for the acquisition of consent.  
 
II. Consent as a legitimate ground for data processing in GDPR 
 
 With regard to the notion of the consent the General Data Protection Regulation is 
based on the previous legal framework, for example, on the provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC and the e-Privacy Directive. However, the GDPR can 
be considered as evolutionary law by tightening and strengthening the role of 
consent
6
. It also set out the conditions for consent to be valid as a legitimate ground 
for data processing, while consent is still a ground for the processing of sensitive data, 
as well as for the transfers of personal data to a third country or an international 
organization that do not ensure an adequate level of protection. Moreover, the consent 
of children is strengthened in GDPR. It is also important to mention that the consent 
of the data subject is presented in various instances in the GDPR, concerning the right 
to be forgotten, automated profiling etc
7
. In particular , according to the article 4 (11) 
of GDPR “ consent of the data subject means any freely given , specific , informed 
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action , signifies agreement to the processing of 
personal data relating to him or her ”8. The GDPR treats consent as the primary source 
of legitimating of processing by strengthening the right of self-determination, albeit, 
                                                          
6 Reijneveld M. D., “Quantified Self , Freedom, and the GDPR”, SCRIPTed: A Journal Of Law, 
Technology and Society, Vol.14 , Issue 2 (December 2017), p 299 
7 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, p 3 
8 Article 4 (11) GDPR. See also Reijneveld M. D., “Quantified Self , Freedom, and the GDPR”, 
SCRIPTed: A Journal Of Law, Technology and Society, Vol.14 , Issue 2 (December 2017), p 299 
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without this implying a withdrawal from the right to protection of personal data
9
. In 
any case, all requirements should be fulfilled in order for the consent to be valid
10
. 
 
1. “Freely Given” Consent 
 
In GDPR the consent should be “freely-given” expressing an act of informational self-
determination. It should be an autonomous act of the data subject and a product of 
free decision, in other words, free from external manipulations. However , there are 
some cases in which consent actually , cannot be given freely, more particularly , 
when there is a clear unbalance between the data subject and the data controller , for 
example when personal data must be provided to public authorities or in the 
employment relations
11
. 
 
 
a. Involuntary actions and voluntary actions made under pressure 
 
 
Taking into account that the consent of the data subject should be a genuine 
expression of the right to informational self- determination, it is presented as a 
“liberty right” with a voluntary mood. In this point, there should be made a reference 
to what has been done so far in accordance with the previous regime in order to make 
it understandable. According to the “Beyleveld and Brownsword” theory there is a 
distinction between involuntary action in the strict sense, because in this case the will 
is overborne and those cases where the action is voluntary but made under pressure. It 
is important to say that when the consent is given under pressure there is an indication 
of the data subject wishes, however, there is no valid consent, as the indication of the 
wishes is not freely given, because there is an external force and this is usually 
                                                          
9 Mitrou L., “The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 71 
10 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p 56 
11 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 169-170 
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exercised by the data controller. In relation to the consent that is given involuntarily, 
the agent failed altogether to form a will rather than acted against its will .There is a 
difference between negative and positive force, because, negative is an act of force 
that intends to the negative impact on the interest of the individual, a threat for 
example, while positive is an act of force that intends to influence the individual 
positively, a persuasion for example
12
. Furthermore, generally, consent given under 
duress is not valid. In the field of data protection, the exercise of positive pressure 
does not invalidate the consent of the data subject as not given freely, to the extent 
that the data subject has been provided with all the necessary information relating to 
his personal data processing and has been given a real choice to decide. The General 
Data Protection Regulation has confirmed this position stating that the individual has 
to be provided with a genuine and free choice and should be able to refuse or 
withdraw his consent without any damage. Consequently, in any case, coercive acts 
always limit the ability of the data subject to provide his valid consent
13
. 
 
 
b. “Freely given” consent and Electronic Health Records (HER) 
 
 According to the sense of “freely given consent” the data subject should have 
acceptable alternatives in order to make a free choice. At this point, it is important to 
mention that in the context of the processing of personal data concerning health in 
electronic health records (EHR) a free consent is considered as a voluntary decision in 
possession of all of his faculties, without any social, financial, psychological coercion. 
In other words, the consent of the patient under the threat of non-treatment or lower 
quality treatment in a medical situation cannot be considered as freely given. 
Consequently, with regard to the processing of personal data concerning health in 
electronic health records (EHR) an informed data subject should have the opportunity 
to make a genuine choice within the framework of his autonomy in order to give a 
                                                          
12 Ibid, pp 171-173 
13 Ibid, p 173. See also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, 
“Handbook on European Data Protection Law” , Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p 
60 
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valid consent
14
. 
 
c. Legal and factual dependencies-Uneven balance of powers 
 
The consent cannot be considered as freely given, when the choices of the data 
subject can be limited by legal or factual dependencies .When the balance of powers 
between the data subject and the data controller is uneven, then the freedom of 
decision of the data subject is jeopardized .In such situations, the Member States have 
to provide for additional safeguards in order to protect the data subject in their 
national legislation. The GDPR foresees that when there is a clear imbalance between 
the data subject and the data controller, then the processing of personal data of the 
data subject should not rely on his consent. Furthermore, an imbalance may exist, 
when the data controller is a public authority and it can impose an obligation by virtue 
of its relevant powers
15
. In this case, taking into account the interest of the data 
subject, the consent of the data subject should not be considered as freely given. With 
regard to the requirement for freely given consent in the context of employment 
relations various Member States have enacted specific legislation or issued soft law 
instruments. In general, there are questions about whether the consent given is valid, 
when there is imbalance of powers, suggesting that a valid consent cannot be given in 
the employment context. Exceptionally, a legitimate ground for the processing of 
personal data in the employment context is the consent of the employee, when 
employees are requested to upload their pictures on the company intranet. In this case, 
the actual uploading of the picture should be considered as valid consent, when the 
employees are offered the choice not to upload their picture if they do not want to. 
Furthermore, it is important to say that in the context of transfers of employee data to 
third countries that do not ensure an adequate level of protection, the employee must 
have a real opportunity to withhold his consent without suffering any damage, or to 
withdraw it subsequently if he changes his mind. It is very interesting to be taken into 
account  the position of the Greek Data Protection Authority (DPA) that with regard 
to the carrying out of genetic tests in the employment context it should only be 
allowed to be based on a specific and explicit legal provision and cannot be based on 
                                                          
14 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 176-177 
15
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p 58 
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the consent of the candidate or the employee . Additionally, for the collection and 
processing of personal data of candidates during recruitment, the Greek DPA took the 
position that the character and personality evaluation tests should be allowed only 
exceptionally and only when it is absolutely necessary and adequate for the 
achievement of a concrete purpose concerning directly the particular position and the 
relevant choice. Taking into account the nature of these data, their collection should 
be allowed only after the written consent of the candidate, after he has been 
adequately informed as regards the methods, criteria, purposes and potential recipients 
of the analyses and their results. Consequently, the Greek DPA, the Article 29 
Working Party and the GDPR took the similar position that the consent of the data 
subject in the employment context is in most cases not freely given
16
. According to 
recital 43 of GDPR, in case of inequality concerning the processing of personal data 
in the context of working relationships, consent is rejected as a legal basis. The 
Authority of Personal Data Protection with Directive 115/2001 has taken the same 
approach. Furthermore, the Regulation recognizes the possibility for Member States 
to lay down national rules on the conditions under which personal data in the context 
of employment can be processed on the basis of the employee’s consent17. However, 
in any case, the processing can be valid, if the data subject consent has not been 
abolished in a way that is contrary to law or morality
18
. 
 
d. Case law defining the context of “freely given” consent 
 
At this point, in order for the context of “freely given” consent to be understandable, it is 
appropriate to quote case-law .On the one hand, according to the joined cases Volker and 
Markus ScheckeGbR/HartmutEifert v. Land Hessen the opinion of the Advocate General 
Sharpston on the validity of the offered consent is very interesting. In accordance with the 
facts of the case Volker and Markus ScheckeGbR and HartmutEifert , the applicants , after 
                                                          
16 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 180-183  
17
Article 88 in conjunction with recital 155 of GDPR. See also Mitrou L., “The General Data 
Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 75  
18 Alexandropoulou - Egyptiadou E., “Personal Data”, Nomiki Bibliothiki Publications, 2016 (in 
Greek), p 88 
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applying to the competent local authorities , received agricultural subsidies from the 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) . The competent authority, the Federal Agency for 
Agriculture and Nutrition, published on its website the data of the beneficiaries of the 
subsidies, more particularly, their names, their place of residence or establishment, their 
postal codes and the annual amounts awarded. Moreover, this website includes a search 
tool in order to enable users simply by entering for example the postal code to obtain the 
list of named beneficiaries of grants from the EAGF or EAFRD. However, the applicants 
wanted to prevent the publication of the relating to them data. Taking into account that the 
applicants were informed in the application form that the authorities are obliged to publish 
their personal data and thus the submission of the application form constitutes their 
consent to this purpose, someone could argue that they could have chosen to avoid 
publication by forgoing the aid. The Advocate General expressed his pointed opinion 
stating that due to a significant economic duress the applicants have no real alternative 
choice, therefore, by not consenting to such publishing, they would not get the financial 
aid, which is essential for their income. In this case, the consent is invalid, because is not 
freely given and non-voluntarily. In conclusion, the freedom in consenting is not 
invalidated only by the exercise of physical or emotional negative force, but also by a 
significant economic duress which is exercised on the data subject
19
. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the facts of the Payback case, a company, the 
defendant, offered consumers a loyalty card, the “Payback” card. A German association of 
consumer organization, the plaintiff, wanted the annulment of three clauses included in the 
paper form, via which consumers could join the loyalty program. According to one of the 
clauses , the customer with his signature agrees that the data he provides , for example 
services , price, amount of discount place and date of transaction etc , will be exclusively 
stored in order to be used for market research purposes .In this particular case, the German 
Federal Court of Justice in its reasoning stated that the consumer who was called to decide 
if he enrolls to the loyalty program and if he would fill in the application form with his 
personal data was not under any legal , financial or factual pressure or coercion and for 
                                                          
19 C-92/09 and C-93/09 (Joined Cases) Volker and Markus Schecke GbR/Hartmut Eifert v. Land 
Hessen [2010], paras . 72-88 
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that reason his consent is considered as “freely given”20. 
 
2. Specific consent 
 
The requirement for specific consent is closely related to the requirement for informed 
consent, because the consent should be specified on the basis of the information that 
is provided to the data subject. In other words, in the previous legislation , the consent 
should be very specific in order to safeguard the right to informational self-
determination. The requirement for specific consent is interpreted as a consent that 
concerns a specific processing of personal data, for a specific person by a specific 
data controller for a specific purpose and when the data is transmitted to a third party, 
it should be clearly specified who the recipients are . The consent of the data subject 
can also concern specific circumstances that may arise in the future
21
. It is noteworthy 
to mention that the CoJ recognized that there is no need for the data subject to renew 
his consent in case the data subject has been informed in the past about the processing 
of his personal data for a specific data processing operation
22
. Furthermore, if the 
statement of consent for the processing of personal data is blanket, the data subject 
cannot realize the importance and the consequences resulting from his consent to the 
processing, and thus, in this case, the consent does not fulfill the requirement of 
specificity
23
. One of the cases in which specific consent is significant according to the 
examination of the Article 29 Working Party, is in the context of transfers of personal 
data to third countries that do not ensure an adequate level of protection. In this case, 
the data subject should give his consent for the particular transfer or for a particular 
category of transfers. Consequently, the data subject cannot give his consent for future 
transfers that are not planned or known at the time when the consent is given. A 
typical example is that the customers of a company cannot give their earlier consent to 
the transfer of their data to a third country in the event when the company is taken 
over by a third one in the future. Nevertheless, the data subject can validly give his 
                                                          
20
 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 195-196 
21 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, pp 59-60. See also Kosta E., 
“Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, pp 219-220 
22 C-543/09 Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2011], para.67 
23
 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, p 221 
15 
 
consent to future transfers of his data to a third county, in case the details of the 
transfer are already specified, notably in terms of purpose and categories of recipients. 
Another element that is important to mention about the specificity requirement is that 
the controller must provide the data subject information on the purpose of the 
processing for which the data are meant for , based on the fairness and the finality 
principles that safeguarded in the existing data protection legislation
24
. 
 
a. Specific consent and Electronic Health Records (EHP) 
 
In the context of the processing of personal data concerning health the specificity 
requirement of the data subject’ s consent concerns a well-defined, concrete situation 
in which the processing of medical data is intended . Thus , if the data subject 
generally agrees to the collection of his medical data for an EHR and to subsequent 
transfers of these medical data of the past and of the future to health professionals that 
are involved in treatment , then his consent would not be considered as specific and 
therefore , it is invalid
25
.  
 
b. Case law defining the context of “specific” consent 
 
It is interesting to mention the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston on the joined cases 
Volker und Markus ScheckeGbR/HartmutEifert v. Land Hessen concerning the context of 
the specific consent .The facts of these cases are mentioned above .The Advocated 
General stated that the statement on the application form that was signed by the applicants 
and which referred to Article 44a of Council Regulation 1290/2005 , actually ,  did not 
explicitly mention the types of information that were going to be published and the fact 
that the data would be published on the website of the Federal Agency for Agriculture and 
Nutrition. Therefore, the application form does not make it unambiguously clear that an 
applicant is consenting to publication of his personal data and the amounts awarded to him 
from the EAGF and/or the EAFRD. Only Article 1(1) of Regulation No 259/2008 sets out 
                                                          
24 Ibid, pp 221-222 
25 Ibid, p 222 
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the full detail of what publication will entail. However, Regulation No 259/2008 is not 
mentioned in the notice on the form and the fact that it is existed cannot be concluded 
from reading the text of either of the two regulations that the application form does 
concern
26
. Therefore, the Advocate General concluded that the fact that there is no 
specific information in the statement on the application form did not render specific the 
notion of the applicants’ consent according to the definition of the data subject’s consent 
in Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive. Consequently, the Advocate General 
focused on the information that should have been provided to the data subject, leaving the 
question concerning the actual meaning of the requirement for specificity without any 
particular answer
27
. For that reason, it is important to say that the specificity of consent 
has been always closely linked to the actual information that the data subject obtains. 
However, at this point it is important to mention that in the field of bioethics full or 
complete specificity of consent is unobtainable and unnecessary in order to be the consent 
valid. Actually, someone could reach the conclusion that with regard to the element of 
specificity of consent in data protection until now there is lack of uniform interpretation of 
what “specific” should mean in this context28. For example, the German Data Protection 
Act does not make any reference to the need for the consent to be “specific”,  however, it 
particularizes the informational requirements for a valid consent. The element that the 
consent has to be specific has not attracted much attention, possibly due to the difficulties 
it raises. Therefore, sometimes the informational requirement overlaps the element of 
specificity
29
. The GDPR in its article 4 (11) foresees particularly, that the subject's consent 
to the processing of his data should be, inter alia, specific and in full knowledge. More 
specifically, in its recital 43 the Regulation adopts the principle of prohibiting the 
provision of total consent, as separate consent is required for distinct processing 
operations
30
. In other words, in accordance with the article 6 in conjunction with recital 32 
of GDPR , consent may relate to processing for one or more purposes. However , it must 
                                                          
26 Ibid, p 223 
27 C-92/09 and C-93/09 (Joined Cases) Volker and Markus Schecke GbR/Hartmut Eifert v. Land 
Hessen [2010], para. 79 
28 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, p 224 
29 Ibid, pp 224-225 
30 Recital 43 GDPR. See also Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 
679/2016/EU”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 43 
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be specific
31
. Exceptionally, the GDPR in order to ensure flexibility which corresponds to 
reality
32, introduces the concept of “broad” or “blanket” or “generic” consent, according to 
which it is possible to be granted an overall consent in the frame of certain areas of 
scientific research , to the extent permitted by the intended purpose . The aim is to 
facilitate scientific research in order for the researcher to get rid of the burden of multiple 
consents when changing purpose in his research
33
. 
. 
3. Informational requirements for valid consent 
 
Taking into account that in the frame of data protection, the consent of data subject 
has to be based on his free decision in order for the data subject to understand what he 
is consenting to, it is significant to support that the data subject should be properly 
informed about the processing of his personal data before giving his consent, in other 
words, the data subject should be aware of the circumstances
34
. In article 10 of the 
Data Protection Directive it was specified that the data controller should at least 
inform adequately the data subject about data controller’s identity and the purpose of 
the processing, about the recipients of the data, the obligation to response to questions 
and the consequences in case of a probable failure to reply, the existence of the right 
to rectify and the right to access. The information obligation intends to make data 
processing more transparent to the data subject
35
. However, there are many cases that 
the complexity of data collection in practice, relationships between vendors and 
technological applications exceed the individual’s ability or willingness to decide to 
control the use and sharing of information through an active choice
36
. 
The Data Protection Directive has foreseen also the option that data controllers are 
                                                          
31 Recital 32 GDPR. See also Mitrou L., “The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas 
Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 79 
32 Mitrou L., “The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 76 
33 Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016/EU”, Sakoulas 
Publications, 2017 (in Greek), pp 43-44 
34 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p 59 
35 Ibid, p 74 
36 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law” , Volume 3 , Leiden-Boston 2013, pp 202-203 
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obliged to give to the data subject additional information, if it is necessary, for 
example additional information concerning some categories of recipients of the data, 
whether responses to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, probable 
consequences in case of failure to reply, or information relating to the existence of the 
right of access to and the right to rectify the data regarding him. Additional 
information may be required in specific situations in order to guarantee the fairness 
and lawfulness of the processing of the data with regard to the data subject
37
. Several 
Member States have used this provision. It is interesting to state that the UK Data 
Protection Act has explicitly linked the informational requirement to the fairness 
principle in order to enable processing with regard to the data subject to be fair. More 
particularly , in such case , a fairness test should be engaged every time there is 
collection and processing of personal data in order to secure that the data subject is 
provided with all the information that is necessary for him in order to give a 
completely  informed consent
38
. According to the Data Protection Directive some 
specific items of information should always be provided to the data subject in order 
for the consent to be valid. The data subject should be duly informed before the 
transfer of his personal data on the specific circumstances in the frame of the general 
principle of loyalty. For instance, the data subjects should be informed about the 
particular risk arising from the fact that their data will be transferred to a country that 
does not provide adequate protection in order for their consent to be valid
39
. The fact 
that some Member States regulate in their national laws the provision of specific 
information to the data subject has led to a number of divergences and to some extent 
to a lack of harmonization on this issue. Therefore, the “fairness test” that was 
suggested above is a better way in order to have sufficient flexibility with regard to 
the information obligations of the data controller and the particularities of each 
processing
40
. 
Consequently, the data subject should be provided in a clear and understandable 
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manner with accurate and absolute information about the types of data that are 
processed and also has to be provided at least with the information included in the 
Data Protection Directive. However, there is still a difficulty in determining in each 
particular situation whether the information is significant. According to the European 
approach to data protection the principle of transparency is required in the frame of 
the data processing .In case of inaccurate or insufficient information, in other words 
lack of transparency, the consent of the data subject renders to invalid
41
. 
In this point , it is very interesting to be mentioned that in the field of bioethics the 
issue concerning how exact the informed consent needs to be both in terms of the 
information to be provided to the patient and of the purposes for which the consent 
was given , is very important in order to give an answer to the question “how much 
information should be provided to the data subject” .Taking into account that 
absolutely specific informed consent forms can lead in most cases to lengthy and 
incomprehensible documents ,one approach could be that the specificity of the 
information should be grounded on what a “reasonable” data controller would be 
willing to disclose or on what a “reasonable” data subject would need to know. 
However, it would not be possible to define these with certainty. In accordance with 
the proposal of Manson and O’Neill in the field of clinical ethics the patients should 
obtain a limited amount of accurate and relevant information by providing friendly 
ways for them to extend this amount and easy ways to abolish consent once given in 
order not to confront the danger of “overinformation”42. The GDPR agrees and 
emphasizes that “overinformation” should be avoided as it may lead to data subject’s 
confusion
43
. In accordance with article 12 of GDPR the controller shall take the 
appropriate measures in order to provide the data subject with any information 
included in articles 13 and 14 and any communication in the frame of articles 15 to 22 
and 34 concerning the data processing. More particularly, according to these 
provisions, the information should be provided in writing or else electronically. At the 
request of the subject, the information may also be given orally, on the condition that 
the identity of the subject is proved by other means. Therefore, the fulfillment of the 
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oral information should be recorded. The subject must be informed by the data 
controller within one month, however ,  this time period may be extended for a further 
two months , if required due to the complexity or the number of subject’s requests. 
The data controller has to inform the data subject about the extension and also about 
any delay
44
. In GDPR applies the principle according to which the information is in 
the same form as that of the application, for example, if the subject submits the 
request electronically, the information is provided, if it is possible, in the same way. 
Although any request by the data subject does not imply an equivalent obligation of 
the data controller, however, the controller is obliged to inform within one month 
about his inaction, about the possibility of a complaint to a supervisory authority or 
about litigation. For instance, the data controller stagnates, in case he cannot verify 
the identity of the data subject. On the other hand , if there is any doubt with regard to 
the identity of the data subject , the controller may request additional information , 
which are necessary for confirmation and consequently , in such a case , it is not about 
collecting new data
45
. In principle, the information is made without any charge, 
however, in case the request of the data subject is obviously abusive or excessive due 
to their recurrent nature, the data controller can either to charge a reasonable fee or to 
refuse to meet the request. According to the article 12 paragraph 3 and article 78 
paragraph 2 of GDPR the clause of abuse of rights is introduced, and for example, a 
request every three months is not an abuse
46
. Furthermore, the GDPR distinguishes 
between personal data collected by the subject (article 13) and those that have not 
been collected by the subject (article 14). Basically, the subject should be informed 
about the identity of the data controller , his contact details , the purpose of the 
communication , the recipients of the data and the intention of the data controller to 
transfer the data to a third country or organization
47
. Moreover, the existence of risks, 
rules, guarantees and rights of the subjects, as well as the specific purposes of the data 
processing, which should be clear, legal and determined at the time of the collection 
of the data, must be disclosed. The GDPR, in article 13 paragraph 2a, introduces also, 
a new type of information regarding the time period in which the data will be stored, 
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while, according to article 14, in case the data are not collected by the data subject, 
then the origin of the data must also be communicated. Additionally, the GDPR 
establishes an obligation to inform about the change and the new purpose of the data 
processing, in case the personal data are used for a purpose other than that for which 
they were collected
48
. The Regulation extends the existing right of information by the 
data controller under articles 33 and 34 by informing the data subject and the 
supervising authority about the breach of personal data. In its recital 85 specifies that 
the data controller within 72 hours from the discovery of the data breach or data loss 
must notify the competent authority and the data subject of the infringement, if the 
nature of the data so requires. In case the notification cannot be made within 72 hours, 
the delay must be justified. Moreover, the data subject is entitled to know the data 
recipient even if he breached the law. The relevant information needs to be 
comprehensive, including the type of data, the number of persons affected, the way of 
the infringement, the persons that were being informed, the method of the breach 
recognition, the handling procedures, the corrective measures, the existing security 
measures, the contact details and the future actions of the data controller
49
.  
Taking into account that the Data Protection Directive has not clarified when the data 
subject should be informed in order to give his consent for the processing of his 
personal data, it is important to be stated that according to the 1984 and 1988 UK 
Data Protection Act and the Greek Data Protection Law the data subject must be 
informed at the time when the data are collected from the data subject. Therefore, by 
offering to the data subject after the collection of his personal data, it could be 
considered that the informational requirement is not fulfilled, because, in such case, 
the validity of the consent is endangered
50
.The right of access is one of the 
fundamental rights of data subject which is satisfied by the obligation of the data 
controller to provide to the data subject with information about the impending data 
processing and more particularly, with relevant information and in an intelligible 
form. For instance, in the online environments, it is not sufficient when the 
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information is available somewhere on the website, but the information notice should 
be definitely visible to the user. Although such a condition is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Data Protection Directive
51
, the GDPR, according to its recital 58, gives special 
gravity, particularly, to the information that are given to children by providing that 
they should be adjusted in such a way in order to be understood easily by them
52
. 
Additionally , the GDPR, according to its article 12 paragraph 7, provides the 
possibility of information in combination with standard icons in a clear , 
comprehensible and readable way , which even if it is available electronically , they 
must be readable also for visually impaired people. However, these symbols should 
not be given without the provision of any other information
53
. 
According to the previous regime the information on the processing of personal data 
should be provided in a clearly visible and simple way directly to the data subject at a 
point where the subject can easily regain it
54
. 
Another interesting and important issue concerning the validity of informed consent is 
the responsibility of the data subject. According to the position of Beyleveld and 
Brownsword the consent is considered as valid, when the data subject has been 
informed adequately and in an intelligible form, however, he did not pay the 
necessary attention. In such case, for example, in the field of online world, when the 
data subject indicates his consent for the processing of his personal data by ticking a 
box or signing a consent form without reading it, the data subject will not be able to 
claim this fact in order to prove his consent’s invalidity55. However, the opinions 
differed, while issues arise with regard to the consent and privacy policies in the field 
of electronic communications and online environments
56
, when the consent cannot be 
grounded on direct communicative transactions between the data controller and the 
data subject
57
. The GDPR gives solution to this issue by contemplating specifically 
                                                          
51
 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, p 213 
52 Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016/EU”, Sakoulas 
Publications, 2017 (in Greek), p 59 
53
 Ibid, p 62 
54 Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013, p 214 
55 Ibid, pp 214-215  
56 Ibid, p 217 
57
 Ibid, p 219 
23 
 
that although it is required for the data subject to be given the possibility to be 
informed , however , the data subject is not obliged to take account of the available 
information on the processing of his personal data . In other words, data subject’s 
consent is not invalid, in case the data subject does not pay the necessary attention to 
the available information
58
. 
Undoubtedly, a major problem arises in the online world concerning the language in 
which the information is provided to the data subject, because the language of internet 
is English and the majority of information with regard to online services is provided 
in English. Therefore, the information society presupposes that the internet user 
knows the English language adequately in order for his consent to be informed
59
. The 
GDPR based on a transparent information policy with regard to the data subject’s 
consent, according to article 5 paragraph1a, which is specified in recital 39, 
introduces that any information relating to the processing of personal data must be 
comprehensible in clear and simple language without misinterpretations
60
. The 
language must be the official language of the Member State, while information can be 
given only cumulatively, and not alternatively in another language. Moreover , the 
language should be simple and understood to someone who is not legal and to people 
with little difficulty in reading due to their age , low educational level , or because 
their mother tongue is not the official language of the Member State . In other words, 
legal terms and terms of foreign languages should be avoided
61
.  
Eventually, the GDPR in its article 13 paragraph 3 foresees that the information duty 
does not exist, when the data subject has already the information. Furthermore, there 
is also no information duty, when data have not been collected by the subject and 
include some business secret in accordance with the Union or Member State law
62
. 
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However, the GDPR in its article 5 paragraph 1a emphasizes the duty of information 
by stating that the breach of the principle of transparency in the processing of personal 
data has a significant impact on the lawfulness of the processing, and therefore, the 
Regulation in its article 83 paragraph 5b imposes an administrative fine of 20.000 
Euros or, in case of a business, 4% of the total world-wide turnover for the preceding 
business year, whichever is the higher
63
. 
It is remarkable the fact that data subjects as users have the tendency to give easily 
their consent , even if their privacy is threatened , they seek access to services and 
wait for the benefits by suffering in the comfort of “negligent” choice and thus , they 
fall in the trap to give their consent . In this case, the consent is the most easy and 
crucial legitimate basis for the legitimacy of “online tracking profiling”64. Although 
the Regulation requires sufficient and reasonable information to be provided to the 
data subject in order to enhance the awareness of the subject’s actions, however, it 
should not be overlooked the “fatigue of information”, because, according to surveys, 
it is necessary to have an average of twenty five days a year to read the terms and 
conditions for the use of the online services. Therefore, the subjects-users, facing the 
dilemma “take it or leave it”, choose to give their consent, because they worry about 
being excluded from the access to information and services. In such case, the truth is 
that the final choices of individuals are not always harmonized with their reservations 
about the risks of their informational privacy, because they are subjected to 
psychological influences and manipulation
65
. However, in this point, it should be paid 
particular attention to the fact that in a “take it or leave it” situation, according to 
recital 43 of GDPR, the consent in no case can be considered as freely given
66
. 
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4. The qualification for unambiguous consent  
 
In the Data Protection Directive there is a reference to the consent of the data subject 
as “unambiguously” given in order to legitimatize  the processing of personal data 
(article 7) and in the context of transfers of personal data to third countries that do not 
ensure an adequate level of protection (article 26(i) (a))
67
. However, the European 
Commission in its report on the review of the Data Protection Directive concluded 
that there is a necessity for the notion of “unambiguous consent” to be further 
clarified and interpreted in a more uniform way. It is interesting to mention that the 
United Kingdom and Germany did not adopt the qualification for unambiguous 
consent
68
.The additional condition of the unambiguous consent does not add any 
actual value to the interpretation of the way the consent should be given. Actually, in 
general, a valid consent can be ambiguous
69
. Actually, according to the GDPR, when 
consent is used as a legitimate ground for data processing, the qualification for 
“unambiguously given” consent has been removed on the transfer of personal data 
that do not ensure an adequate level of protection
70
. 
At this point, it is very interesting to mention the Lindqvist Case that implied the need 
for the unambiguous consent of individuals even when someone thinks that such 
consent is unnecessary and clarified the sense of unambiguity. According to the facts, 
Mrs Bodil Lindqvist, a catechist in the parish of a small city in Sweden, during the 
course of a data processing, created an internet page. Parishioners, using this page, 
could obtain information they might need. On this page, she provided personal 
information about her and some of her colleagues, for example information about 
their jobs and hobbies, family conditions and telephone numbers. She even included 
information about her colleagues, for example that one of them had injured her leg 
and for that reason she was working half time. Mrs Lindqvist did not inform them 
about this internet page and therefore, their colleagues did not consent on the 
processing of their personal data .Taking into account the large number of personal 
information that is published online every day, questions raise .Would the consent of 
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the colleagues of Mrs Lindqvist be necessary? The Court of Justice found that if Mrs 
Lindqvist had obtained the consent of her colleagues, in this case, the processing of 
personal data could have been legitimated. However, someone could support that the 
data subject’s consent on publishing information about him online, would be 
practically unnecessary
71
. Additionally, the Court of Justice in its ruling on the 
Lindqvist case took an interesting position on the “household exemption” and its 
interpretation in accordance with the data publication on the internet. More 
particularly, the household exemption is related only to activities in the context of 
private or family life of individuals and it has clearly not to do with the processing of 
personal data by publishing on the internet. In 2007, the Swedish data protection 
legislation introduced the “unstructured processing”, which facilitated the everyday 
processing of personal data in electronic communications. In this case, there is a focus 
on the structure of the data and not on the type of the information in any continuous 
text, the sending of e-mails with personal data, the publishing of personal information 
on websites or the recordings of images or sound. In other words, the unstructured 
processing of personal data is allowed unless it constitutes an abuse of individual’s 
privacy, for example, such infringement is constituted by the spreading of personal 
data in order to harm the reputation of an individual or the intentional use of 
misleading personal data .Consequently, the exceptional unstructured processing of 
personal data implies a balance test in order to ensure that individual’s privacy is not 
infringed
72
. The European Commission with regard to the provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive made a distinction between processing of personal data in the 
public and in the private sector putting as priority the consent of the data subject on 
the processing of personal data and therefore, the processing of personal data without 
the consent of the data subject was only allowed in certain circumstances. In 1992, the 
European Parliament eliminated this distinction introducing the consent as one of the 
six grounds that legitimated the processing of personal data. Actually, the Czech 
Republic, France, Greece and Portugal, have adopted consent as the primary ground 
in order to be the processing of personal data legitimate
73
. The Essence of 
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“Unambiguously” is necessary in order to cover cases when the data subject is under 
pressure for giving his consent for the processing of his personal data. For instance, 
this could be happened when an employee gives his permission for the processing of 
his personal data by his employer. The unambiguity entails that the data processing is 
based on a decision of the data subject. The fact that the consent is given 
unambiguously inferred from certain actions of the data subject and therefore, there is 
no doubt about the fact that the consent has actually been given
74
. Additionally, it is 
important to say that according to the position of the article 29 Working Party, in the 
frame of transfers of data to third countries, “unambiguous consent” should be 
constituted by a positive and specific act, which entails that the beyond any doubts 
consent of the data subject for the transfer of his data has to be obtained prior to the 
actual transfer. Taking into account that in the frame of transfers of data to  third 
countries there is indirect contact between the data controller and the data subject , in 
practice , it is difficult to base the transfer of personal data to third countries that do 
not ensure an adequate level of protection on the consent of the data subject, because 
the data controller on one hand has to prove that the consent of each data subject has 
really been obtained, and on the other hand that the consent of the data subject is 
based on sufficiently precise information, including information on the lack of protec-
tion in the third country . In practice, in most of these cases, a contract between the 
data subject and the data controller could be useful. Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
Luxembourg, which have included the element that the consent has to be 
unambiguous, have already adopted this approach
75
. 
The General Data Protection Regulation foresees specifically, already from the 
definition given in its Article 4 (11), consent must be a statement of will, free, 
concrete and in complete awareness by which the data subject indicates that he agrees 
with a statement or a clear positive action that his personal data may be processed
76
. 
In other words, in practice, there must be an unambiguous indication of the data 
subject's wish that the way the consent is collected should leave no room for doubt
77
. 
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a. Ways how to express unambiguous consent  
 
The General Data Protection Regulation particularize the ways how the consent can 
be given in order to signify the agreement of the data subject to the processing of his 
personal data .In particular , this can be happened either by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action . In other words, consent can be expressed via the ticking of a box, 
in online environments, and via any other statement or conduct that would clearly 
show that the data subject wishes to consent to the processing of his personal data in a 
particular context
78
. In this point, it is important to say that the recital 32 of GDPR 
points out that with regard to the example of providing consent via ticking a box 
should be complemented by the explicit clarification that an active action on behalf of 
the data subjects in ticking the box is needed and that the use of pre-ticked boxes 
should not be considered as giving valid consent. Moreover, in connection with the 
electronic consent the GDPR introduces that in case the consent of the data subject is 
to be given after an electronic request, the request must be unambiguous, concise and 
not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided
79
.This 
fact is actually, softening the requirements of the consent in online environments, 
because it would also allow actions such as downloading an application or playing an 
online game to constitute consent
80
.  
 
b. Implied consent 
 
Generally, the consent of the data subject cannot result from silence. Proportionally, 
in data protection the data subject’s consent can be inferred from specific actions of 
the data subject, however, it should not be inferred in case there is no action or 
complete silence of the data subject
81
. In this point, it is significant to be clarified that 
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the full silence of the data subject, in the notion of complete lack of action cannot be 
considered as “signification”, because some kind of action is needed for the 
processing of his personal data
82
. However , although the total silence of the data 
subject would not be considered as consent , when the silence is combined with some 
other actions of the data subject , for example with the fact that the data subject had 
given an earlier positive indication of his consent , then it could be sufficient
83
. The 
GDPR in its recital 32 follows the same line by quoting indicative ways of expressing 
consent, for example, the completion of a box when visiting a website, the choice of 
the desired technical arrangements for information society services or a statement or a 
behavior that clearly states that the data subject accepts the proposal to process the 
personal data that concerned
84
, while it is clarified that silence, pre-filled squares or 
inaction should not be considered as consent
85
. 
 
5. Explicit consent 
The General Data Protection Regulation initiates some significant changes to the 
definition of consent. Besides freely given, specific and informed - requirements 
which are already foreseen in the Data Protection Directive-, the consent of the data 
subject has to be also unambiguous. The Data Protection Directive requires that 
consent is ‘explicit’ only in relation to the processing of sensitive data. In General 
Data Protection Regulation the criterion that consent has to be ‘explicit’ is added in 
order to avoid parallelism with ‘unambiguous’ consent and in order to have one single 
definition of consent, ensuring that the data subject realizing that, and to what, he or 
she gives consent . In other words, in practice, there must be an unambiguous 
indication of the data subject's wish that the way the consent is collected should leave 
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no room for doubt
86
. 
 
a. Explicit consent for the processing of sensitive data 
 
Although the processing of sensitive data, such as data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, is in principle prohibited, 
however, their processing is exceptionally allowed, when the data subject has given 
his explicit consent, except in cases when the prohibition of the processing of 
sensitive data may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his consent. Until now the 
exceptional processing of sensitive data was allowed, in case the processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject and when the data subject is 
physically or legally incapable of giving his consent and also, when it is carried out by 
a foundation, association or any other non-profitseeking body with a political, 
philosophical, religious or trade-union aim, when the processing takes place in the 
course of its legitimate activities. This is allowed only when the processing concerns 
solely the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in 
relation to its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party without the 
consent of the data subjects
87
. The concept of “explicit” consent in the context of the 
processing of special categories of data is also met in the Data Protection Directive 
.This kind of data are commonly known as “sensitive data”. In principle, their 
processing is prohibited and exceptionally allowed when there is an explicit consent 
of the data subject. Some Member States have interpreted the condition for explicit 
consent as written
88
. The consent is explicit when it is indicated in such a way (for 
example electronically, verbally, written) that the relative wish of the subject comes 
directly
89
. The GDPR, in its article 9 paragraph 2a, refers to explicit consent as an 
additional guarantee in the case of lawful processing of specific data categories
90
. 
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b. The concept of sensitive data 
 
 In this point, it is necessary to clarify the notion of “Sensitive Data”. In principle, it is 
important to say that the data subjects’ right to privacy is not jeopardized by the 
content of the personal data itself. However, there are particular categories of personal 
data that can threaten the data subjects’ right to privacy exactly due to their content91. 
In accordance with the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, such data are personal 
data which concern the past , current or future , disclosing racial or ethnic origin , for 
example , the information on the skin color of the data subject , political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs , for example , all relevant activities of the data 
subject, including the case when a data subject does not belong to any relevant 
organization , trade-union organization , and data with regard to health or sex life , for 
example , the drug or alcohol abuse of the data subject
92
. The General Data Protection 
Regulation, in article 9 paragraph 1, apart from these categories, includes further in 
the frame of the notion of sensitive data the processing of genetic data with regard to 
genetic material analysis, biometric data for the unambiguous identification of the 
individual and data that regard to the sexual orientation
93
. It should be stated that there 
is an important change from the Directive to the Regulation in the frame of sensitive 
data, as particularly, the Regulation includes genetic and biometric data as personal 
data
94
. 
At this point, it is important to make a discrimination between health data as a term 
and medical data. In particular, health data as a term is wider, because these data are 
kept not only by doctors but also by persons who do not have the medical capacity, 
for example, physiotherapist or psychologist. It is interesting to mention that health 
data are not only those which are kept in the records of the National Medical Assisted 
Reproduction, but also the data concerning the donors and the recipients of human 
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tissues and are kept by the National Organization of Transplantation. Additionally, as 
sensitive data can be considered the data administered by the Social Services, for 
example, issues of adoptions, and also the data administered by Insurance and 
Retirement Institutions
95
. Also, it should be noted that data of economic behavior and 
bank accounts are not sensitive, although they are protected by banking secrecy
96
. 
Nevertheless the Data Protection Directive did not include the data regarding to 
criminal convictions to the list of sensitive data in its relevant article, the processing 
of which is prohibited, it provides particular safeguards in connection with the 
processing of data concerning offences, criminal convictions or security measures, 
which may have taken place only under the control of official authority, or if suitable 
particular safeguards are provided under national law.  Some Member States have 
actually extended the list in order to include more types of data, such as data on debts, 
financial standing and the payment of welfare
97
. 
The GDPR introduces a specific provision with regard to the processing of personal 
data concerning criminal convictions and offences in its article 10. It foresees 
particularly, that “Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and 
offences or related security measures…shall be carried out only under the control of 
official authority or when the processing is authorized by Union or Member State law 
providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Any 
comprehensive register of criminal convictions shall be kept only under the control of 
official authority”98.   
The distinction between simple, in other words non-sensible and sensitive data is of 
practical importance, because sensitive data should receive reinforced legal 
protection. According to the Greek Data Protection Law (Law 2472/1997) in the 
processing of sensitive data the consent is required to be written, while in the 
processing of simple data it is sufficient to be verbally, however in any case explicit
99
. 
Particularly, in electronic communications consent is required to be written or 
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electronically supplied
100
. According to the article 9 paragraph 2a of the GDPR in the 
frame of sensitive data the data subject is required to give his explicit consent
101
. 
In the frame of the sensitive data the explicit  consent of the data subject is required, 
because the unambiguous  consent that is asked for the processing of personal data 
is not considered as sufficient. However, the term explicit  in the context of the 
processing of sensitive data and how it differs from unambiguous consent is not 
defined in any way
102
. A higher standard of proof, in which the consent is distinctly 
stated is implied by an explicit consent. In the frame of the meaning of the explicit 
consent it is considered as an affirmative act by the data subject which clearly consent 
to the processing .In accordance with the Article 29 Working Party, a written consent 
is not required for the processing of sensitive data, because on the one hand, the 
explicit  consent must be related specifically to the sensitivity of the data, taking into 
account that the data subject must be aware that he is disclaiming special protection. 
However, on the other hand, oral consent may not be easy to be proved. It is 
interesting to mention that the Dutch Data Protection Authority supported that the 
consent of the data subject is explicit when the data subject has expressed itself 
actively with regard to the scope of the consent
103
. However, in practice, difficulties 
arise, because the data controller has to be in a position to prove that the explicit 
consent of the data subject is obtained relying on precise information. For example, 
when the consent of the data subject for the processing of his health data has to be 
obtained by the data controller and the two parties have no direct contact. Therefore, 
several Member States have promoted written consent with regard to the processing 
of sensitive data. In particular, it is worthy to be said that the French Data Protection 
Act and the Greek Data Protection Law required the “express consent” for the 
processing of sensitive data and the French Courts interpreted this provision as “in 
writing”.  According to the Belgian Data Protection Act the processing of sensitive 
data also required the written consent of the data subject .Due to this fact criticism has 
been raised by legal scholars, who argue that the Belgian Data Protection Act goes 
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beyond the Data Protection Directive by requiring written instead of explicit consent. 
This example proves that there is no perspicuity among the European Member States 
with regard to how the requirement for explicit consent should be interpreted
104
. 
Consequently, it has to be said that a harmonized pan-European interpretation of the 
requirement for explicit consent is not easy to be achieved
105
 
. 
c. Explicit consent and profiling in the Data Protection Regulation 
 
It is important to note that the General Data Protection Regulation introduces consent 
with regard to the automated processing of personal data for profiling. In particular, 
the GDPR provides safeguards for individuals against the risk that a potentially 
damaging decision is taken without human intervention. According to the Article 22 
of the GDPR the data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision when it is 
based on automated processing and it produces a legal effect or a similarly significant 
effect on the data subject. This right does not apply if the decision inter alia, based on 
explicit consent
106
. The GDPR defines profiling as any form of automated processing 
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects of the data subject, specifically, to 
predict or analyze his performance at work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, reliability, behavior, location or movements. Additionally, automated 
decisions taken for the purposes listed in article 9 paragraph 2 should not inter alia, be 
based on the explicit consent of the data subject
107
. 
 
III. Legal capacity for the provision of consent-Physical or legal incapacity 
 
The consent can be given by the data subject or by the statutory or legal 
representative, when the data subject is incapable of giving his consent. The previous 
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legislation with regard to the Data Protection did not address the issue of physical or 
legal incapacity, but leaves this to the national legislation of the Member States. 
However, it is important to mention that the agreement of an individual who is 
incapable of consenting to the processing of his personal data, should not be taken 
into account as strict sensus consent, in accordance with the Data Protection 
Directive
108
. The General Data Protection Regulation introduces Article 8 to the 
processing of personal data of children, paying special attention to issues concerning 
under ages’ consent. When an information society service is offered directly to a 
child, the GDPR is differentiating between children above at least and below 16 years 
of age. In the latter case, the processing of the children’s data is lawful only to the 
extent that the child’s parent or custodian has given or authorized their consent. 
However, in any case, if Member States want to provide by law a lower age for 
similar purposes, such lower age is not below 13 years
109
. In this point, the Regulation 
leaves a blank by not making any provision on other sensitive groups without physical 
or legal capacity. It could be indicated that the Regulation probably, leaves this issue 
to the national legislation of the Member States. 
 
IV. Unlawful processing despite the existence of consent 
 
It should be emphasized that the consent of the subject to the processing of his 
personal data, even if it is freely given, specific, unambiguous and informed, in other 
words it meets the requirements of the law as it was mentioned above, is not 
considered as lawful, when the consent is not legal for any other reason, for example, 
when it violates the principles of the processing or when there is a law stating that in a 
particular case the consent does not cease the prohibition
110
. At this point, it is 
important to mention indicatively some cases in order to be understandable. For 
instance , it is not legitimate to complete a specific question to a form of the National 
Statistical Service on the consent of the subject on the removal of his tissues in the 
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frame of transplantation , because it exceeds the purpose of the relative processing
111
, 
or it is not legitimate to include the religion or the fingerprint or the gender or the 
occupation or the surname of the husband or wife or the place of residence or the 
nationality in the police identities , because any processing of personal data that goes 
beyond the intended purpose, for example the confirmation of the identity of the 
subject , or is not offered and necessary to achieve this purpose , is not lawful and all 
these data are unnecessary in order to confirm the identity of the subject
112
, moreover, 
it is unlawful to process the personal data in the frame of the concept of a television 
show , because in this case the processing leads to the disappearance of private life 
and the depreciation of human existence
113
. At this point, it is remarkable the fact that 
the GDPR remains silent by not foreseeing anything specific. 
 
V. Exceptions to the rule of  necessity of consent 
 
The subject’s right of informational self-determination is delimited by deliberations, 
which serves either his contractual relations, or his objective interest, or the general 
interest, or the interest of third persons, which in any given case exceeds the rights 
and the interest of the subject. Therefore, the data controller’s obligation to obtain the 
consent of the data subject is amenable to exceptions. However , it is important to 
emphasize that even if  the subject’s consent is not required for the processing of his 
personal data , the data controller has the obligation to inform the subject about the 
processing , unless it is an exceptional case , where , according to the law , no 
information is needed , when the collection of the data relates particularly to public 
persons for journalistic purposes , for national security or for the investigation of 
particularly serious crimes . There are exceptions to the rule of necessity of consent 
firstly, in the frame of simple data and subsequently, in the frame of sensitive data
114
. 
At this point, it is interesting to mention that in accordance with the 87/2013 decision, 
the Court of Appeals of Thessaloniki in Greece judged that in the frame of this case, 
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although the employer was not required to obtain the employee’s consent in order to 
inform the third party about the amount of the redundancy payment received by the 
employee, however, he was obliged to inform the employee first about what he 
intended to do
115
. 
 
a. Processing of simple data without subject’s consent 
 
There are some exceptional cases in article 6 paragraph 1b,c,d,e,f of GDPR based on 
the provisions of  the Data Protection Directive , in which processing of simple data is 
allowed without subject’s consent116: 
 when processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which 
the data subject is a party 
117
, for example , the indication of the shared data 
block of the apartment owners may be carried out without their consent, to the 
extent that it is necessary for management purposes , because it is required for 
the fulfillment of contractual obligations . Additionally, the consent of 
employees is not required in order for their data to be processed, in case, it is 
necessary for determining their payment
118
. 
 when the processing is necessary in order to fulfill the obligation of the 
controller , which is imposed by the law
119
, for example, the processing of 
customers’ data from a merchant for tax purposes to the competent tax 
authority
120
. 
 when processing is necessary in order to preserve the vital interest of the 
data subject
121
, for example, it is legitimate to process the personal data of the 
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subject, whose life or health is in danger, and therefore, he is unable to give 
his consent to the hospital in order to create a medical file, because he is 
presumed that he would have given his consent, if he was not in a physical or 
legal weakness
122
. 
  when the processing is necessary for the execution of a project of public 
interest or a project , which is carried out by a public authority , or 
assigned by this authority to the controller or a third party
123
,for example , 
the processing of personal data of taxpayers in order to impose on them legal 
fees
124
 and also , the disclosure of the names of the members of the 
Administrative Board and their remuneration to the Members of Parliament in 
the frame of parliamentary control
125
. 
 When the processing is absolutely necessary in order to satisfy the 
legitimate interest of the controller or of third parties , or when the pre-
mentioned legitimate interest obviously overrides the rights and interests 
of the subject and does not undermine his fundamental freedoms, 
however, this shall not apply when the public authorities carry out the 
processing in the performance of their tasks
126
, for instance , it is legitimate 
for the company TEIRESIAS S.A. to keep a “black list” of bad-payers , 
because the interest of the bank overrides the interest of the subjects not to 
process their financial data
127
, and also , the providing of evidence from the 
disciplinary file of an employer to her colleagues is deemed to be lawful for 
the purpose of using them in order to challenge her claim against them
128
.  
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b. Processing of sensitive data without subject’s consent 
 
Additionally, there are some exceptional cases, according to the GDPR based on the 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive, in which processing of sensitive data is 
also allowed without subject’s consent. These are the following129: 
 
 when processing is necessary in order to preserve the vital interest of the 
data subject
130
, for example, it is legitimate to process the personal data of the 
subject, whose life or health is in danger, and therefore, he is unable to give 
his consent to the hospital in order to create a medical file, because it is 
presumed that he would have given his consent, if he was not in a physical or 
legal weakness
131
. 
 When the processing relates to data made public by the subject132, for 
example, with his interview, publications or public speech, or on the internet, 
or it is necessary for the recognition, the exercise or the defense of subject’s or 
third party’s right to a court or to a disciplinary body, on condition that the 
processing was not done illegally at the stage of collecting or at a subsequent 
stage
133
. 
 When the processing concerns health data and is performed by a person 
professionally engaged in the services of health care
134
, for example, 
physiotherapists, doctors , midwives , psychologists etc. , who have a duty of 
confidentiality under the condition that processing is necessary for the 
prevention, diagnosis, hospitalization or management of health services. 
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Instead, the consent of the subject is required, when personal data of patients 
are used at medical conferences
135
. 
 
The GDPR in paragraph 2 b, d, f, g, i, j of article 9, apart from these cases, introduces 
further some additional relevant cases
136
. More particularly , the processing of 
sensitive data in GDPR is allowed without subject’s consent , additionally , when   
<< (b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and 
exercising specific rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of 
employment and social security and social protection law , in so far as it is authorized 
by Union or Member State law or a collective agreement pursuant to Member State 
law providing for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the interests 
of the data subject; (d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate 
activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation, association or any other not-
for-profit body with a political , philosophical , religious or trade-union aim and on 
condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former members of 
the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its 
purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the 
consent of the data subjects; (f) processing is necessary for the establishment , 
exercise or defense of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial 
capacity; (g) processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest , on the 
basis of Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued , 
respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and 
specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data 
subject ; (i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public 
health , such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring 
high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal devices , on the 
basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific 
measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject , in particular 
professional secrecy ; or (j) processing is necessary for achieving purposes in the 
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public interest , scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in 
accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law which shall be 
proportionate to the aim pursued , respect the essence of the right to data protection 
and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights 
and the interests of the data subject>>
137
. 
 
Despite all these mentioned above, it is also significant to state that although the 
GDPR in its article 9 paragraph 2e repeats the relevant provision of the Directive 
95/46/EK, but in a different social and technological context, and particularly, that 
processing of sensitive data is allowed without subject’s consent when the processing 
relates to data made public by the subject, the Regulation seems to ignore the reality 
of the subject’s self-exposure and the problems that arises138. For instance, in case 
employees have posted their personal data in an unreasonable time and in a different 
context on digital social networks, employers should not consider these information, 
even if they are the same as those posted in publicly available profiles or in public 
accounts in social networking tools
139. In the frame of subject’s self-exposure and his 
sensitive data, it should be evaluated not only the obvious character and the purpose 
of the publicity, but also the context in which it is carried out, because the subject may 
upload personal information that relate to it in a different context and relevance and 
possibly at moments that are at a distance from their use
140
. 
Moreover, at this point, it should be noted that according to article 9 paragraph 4 of 
GDPR, Member States may adopt more conditions in order to include limitations 
concerning the processing of genetic data, biometric data or health data
141
. 
In conclusion, taking into account the silence of the Regulation mentioned above with 
regard to the exceptions in the context of the absence of consent to the processing of 
simple personal data, someone could note in this point that the Regulation in any case 
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intends to give particular importance to the promotion of sensitive data. 
 
VI. The withdrawal of consent 
 
Although the previous legislation did not explicitly refer to the withdrawal of consent, 
this right derives from the right to informational self-determination of the data 
subject. The data subject cannot waive his right to withdraw his consent in the future. 
At this point , it is important to indicate that there is a differentiation between the 
withdrawal of consent and the data subject’s right to object, because , on the one 
hand, the withdrawal of consent concerns a consent that has already been given by the 
data subject for the processing of his personal data, and on the other hand, the right to 
object is applicable to data processing that is not based on the consent of the data 
subject, but on another of the grounds that is necessary for the lawfulness of the data 
processing. The data subject has also the possibility to withdraw his consent, 
whenever he wishes. Moreover, due to the withdrawal of consent, the data has no 
obligation to delete all traces of prior processing, if documentation is necessary
142
. 
The GDPR is stricter than the previous legislation with regard to the withdrawal, 
therefore, it is required explicitly in accordance with its article 7 paragraph 3 that the 
withdrawal of subject’s consent must be as easy as providing it in the frame of 
principle of freedom of subject’s choice and it shall not influence the lawfulness of 
processing before consent’s withdrawal. Moreover, like the previous legislation, it 
requires subject to be informed of his right to withdraw his consent before he gives 
it
143
.  
 
 
VII. Right to erasure or “ right to be forgotten” 
 
 
The withdrawal is effective only for the future and not retrospectively, because in 
such case, the data processing that was based on the given consent unlawful, would be 
rendered. In that sense the data subject is not able to control personal data to the 
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processing of which he consented in the past
144
. The GDPR introduces the “right to be 
forgotten” in order to restore the power balance between data subjects and data 
controllers with regard to the adaption of the data subject’ s choices for the processing 
of his personal data . This right ensures that when an individual no longer wants their 
personal data to be processed, and if there is no legitimate reason for an organization 
to keep it, they should be removed. The GDPR complements the right of the data 
subject to ask the erasure of his personal data which was foreseen in the Data 
Protection Directive by the right to be forgotten. At this point, it is important to state 
that the GDPR improperly identifies the meaning of the oblivion with the sense of 
deletion
145
. More specifically, the General Data Protection Regulation in article 17 
foresees that the data subject has the right to ask the data controller to erase personal 
data that relate to him and not to disseminate them further. For example , this can 
happen when the data are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were 
collected or further processed, when the data subject withdraws his consent for the 
processing of his personal data and the processing cannot be based on another 
legitimate ground, when the storage period to which the data subject had consented 
has expired, when the data subject objects to the processing of his personal data, and 
when the data processing does not comply with any provisions of the GDPR
146
. 
Furthermore, the GDPR introduces that when the data controller has made the 
personal data public, third parties should be informed that they are processing data for 
which the data subject wants to exercise his right to be forgotten, asking them to 
eliminate any links to, or copy or replication of the data. In this case, technical 
measures have to be taken by data controller with “all reasonable steps” generally, 
concerning the related data. In this point , it is important to be mentioned the fact that 
the data controller sometimes may not even be knowledgeable of all existing copies or 
replications of the data or of all the places where personal data have been diffused . In 
any case, the GDPR actually, does not introduce an obligation of these third parties to 
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carry out the erasure of the data. Therefore, it is remarkable that the right to be 
forgotten in the GDPR may have significant interpretative difficulties on the Internet 
use
147
. 
 
VIII. Burden of proof for the acquisition of consent 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation reinforces the concept of consent by 
introducing the general principle of accountability into its article 7 paragraph 1
148
. It 
clarifies that the data controller has the burden of proof that the data subject consent 
has been provided for specified purposes. Taking into account that the data controller 
will be responsible to prove that the data subject consent was provided in a valid way 
for a specific data processing operation, the data controller should also use reliable 
means in order to obtain the consent within the framework of the sensitivity of each 
particular data processing
149
. In this way, the need to document the receipt of consent 
in writing or by electronic means is registered
150
. 
 
IX. Overall assessment and future perspectives 
 
The replacement of the Data Protection Directive with the GDPR entails the 
development of the existing legislation in the frame of data protection and more 
particularly, the empowerment of the right of consent by converting this right to a 
fundamental source of legitimization of the processing. In other words, it provides 
more flexibility, legal certainty and coherence by covering the gaps of the law and 
clarifying some ambiguities. It has added criteria and conditions in order to ensure the 
provision of consent in relation to the freedom of choice and the total awareness of 
the subject when he gives his consent. Furthermore, the GDPR establishes more 
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transparency and simple information policies and thus, it gives the control to the data 
subject
151
.  
More specifically, in GDPR the consent should be “freely-given” expressing an act of 
informational self-determination. It should be also an autonomous act of the data 
subject and a product of free decision, in other words, free from external 
manipulations. However, there are some cases in which consent actually, cannot be 
given freely, more particularly, when there is a clear unbalance between the data 
subject and the data controller.  
Moreover, the GDPR in its article 4 (11) foresees particularly, that the subject's 
consent to the processing of his data should be, inter alia, specific and in full 
knowledge. More specifically, in its recital 43 the Regulation adopts the principle of 
prohibiting the provision of total consent, as separate consent is required for distinct 
processing operations. In other words, in accordance with the article 6 in conjunction 
with recital 32 of GDPR, consent may relate to processing for one or more purposes. 
However, it must be specific. Exceptionally, the GDPR in order to ensure flexibility 
which corresponds to reality, introduces the concept of “broad” or “blanket” or 
“generic” consent, according to which it is possible to be granted an overall consent in 
the frame of certain areas of scientific research , to the extent permitted by the 
intended purpose. The aim is to facilitate scientific research in order for the researcher 
to get rid of the burden of multiple consents when changing purpose in his research. 
Furthermore, the GDPR based on a transparent information policy with regard to the 
data subject’s consent, according to article 5 paragraph1a, which is specified in recital 
39, introduces that any information relating to the processing of personal data must be 
comprehensible in clear and simple language without misinterpretations. In GDPR 
with regard to the concept of unambiguous consent there must be an unambiguous 
indication of the data subject's wish that the way the consent is collected should leave 
no room for doubt. The criterion that consent has to be ‘explicit’ is added in order to 
avoid parallelism with ‘unambiguous’ consent and in order to have one single 
definition of consent, ensuring that the data subject realizing that, and to what, he or 
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she gives consent. In particular, the GDPR, in its article 9 paragraph 2a, refers to 
explicit consent as an additional guarantee in the case of lawful processing of specific 
data categories.  
Additionally, the General Data Protection Regulation introduces Article 8 to the 
processing of personal data of children, paying special attention to issues concerning 
under ages’ consent. However, it should be taken into account that the GDPR foresees 
nothing with regard to the protection of sensitive groups other than children, for 
example, online illiterates. 
However, it is remarkable the fact that the GDPR remains silent by not foreseeing 
anything specific with regard to the unlawfulness of the processing despite the 
existence of consent. It is also significant to state that although the GDPR in its article 
9 paragraph 2e repeats the relevant provision of the Directive 95/46/EK, but in a 
different social and technological context, and particularly, that processing of 
sensitive data is allowed without subject’s consent when the processing relates to data 
made public by the subject, the Regulation seems to ignore the reality of the subject’s 
self-exposure and the problems that arise.  
The GDPR is stricter than the previous legislation with regard to the withdrawal , 
therefore, it is required explicitly that the withdrawal of subject’s consent must be as 
easy as providing it in the frame of principle of freedom of subject’s choice and it 
shall not influence the lawfulness of processing before consent’s withdrawal. 
Moreover, the Regulation based on the previous legislation requires subject to be 
informed of his right to withdraw his consent before he gives it. The General Data 
Protection Regulation introduces the “right to be forgotten” in order to restore the 
power balance between data subjects and data controllers with regard to the adaption 
of the data subject’ s choices for the processing of his personal data . This right 
ensures that when an individual no longer wants their personal data to be processed, 
and if there is no legitimate reason for an organization to keep it, they should be 
removed. Furthermore, the GDPR introduces that when the data controller has made 
the personal data public, third parties should be informed that they are processing data 
for which the data subject wants to exercise his right to be forgotten. . In any case, 
however, the GDPR actually, does not introduce an obligation of these third parties to 
carry out the erasure of the data. Therefore, it is remarkable that the right to be 
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forgotten in the General Data Protection Regulation may have significant 
interpretative difficulties on the Internet use.  
The General Data Protection Regulation also reinforces the concept of consent by 
introducing the general principle of accountability into its article 7 paragraph 1. The 
data controller will be responsible to prove that the data subject consent was provided 
in a valid way for a specific data processing operation, the data controller should also 
use reliable means in order to obtain the consent within the framework of the 
sensitivity of each particular data processing. 
In any case, it can be argued that the GDPR, on the one hand, rejects the trend 
towards liberalization of personal data that is adopted by Member States such as 
Germany, on the other hand, the Regulation should not be considered as conservative. 
It is an evolution of the previous data protection law and not a revolutionary law
152
.  
Eventually, it cannot be overlooked the fact that the rapid development of the 
technology and the complexity of contemporary needs lead, in practice, to the 
emergence of problems. In conclusion, although the contribution of the Regulation is 
very important with the changes it brought in the frame of the notion of consent, 
however, there is a possibility of completing and further developing, because it still 
leaves voids and ambiguities in the law. Otherwise, the legislation in the context of 
either European or global harmonization will always have the need for development 
and improvement. 
 
X. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, consent has always been a basic concept in the context of the 
protection of personal data, nevertheless it has not always been clear, when it is 
required and under what conditions it is valid. There have been divergences in the 
transposition of the relevant provisions of the Directive 95/46/EK into the Member 
States, while the Law 2472/97 has been more detailed. Eventually, the GDPR brings 
about few, however, significant changes
153
.The replacement of the Directive with the 
                                                          
152 See also Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016/EU”, 
Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), pp 123-124 
153 Mitrou L., “The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek), pp 
72-73 
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Regulation was aimed at more flexibility, legal certainty and coherence by 
strengthening the right of consent and by converting this right to a fundamental source 
of the processing legitimization. Indeed, the Regulation puts some important 
standards in order to define a uniform regulatory environment for different legal 
systems
154
. However, considering that we are living at a time when technology is 
rapidly evolving, and therefore, a harmonized pan-European interpretation and 
application of the requirements for consent is not easy to be achieved, it could be 
supported that the GDPR is a further step in the evolution of the law in the frame of 
the protection of personal data, however, with clear margins of development. 
Consequently, due to the complexity of contemporary needs and the trend for 
development, there will always be room for improvement in each legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154 Albrecht J. P., “How the GDPR will change the World”, European Data Protection Law Review 
(EDPL), Vol.2, Issue 3 (2016), p 288 
 
49 
 
REFERENCES 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Albrecht J. P., “How the GDPR will change the World”, European Data Protection 
Law Review (EDPL), Vol.2, Issue 3 (2016), pp. 287 et seq. 
Alexandropoulou - Egyptiadou E., “Personal Data”, Nomiki Bibliothiki Publications, 
2016 (in Greek) 
Carolan E., “The continuing problems with online consent under the EU’s emerging 
data protection principles”, Computer Law & Security Review 32 (2016), pp. 462 et 
seq. 
Edward L., “Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to Be Forgotten”, U.C. Davis Law Review, Vol.49 , Issue 3 (February 2016), pp. 1017 
et seq. 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights / Council of Europe, “Handbook on 
European Data Protection Law”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014  
Inglezakis I., “The consent in Personal Data Law” in:  Kotsali L., Personal Data (in 
greek), Nomiki Bibliothiki Publications, 2016, pp. 95 et seq. (in Greek) 
Kosta E., “Consent in European Data Protection Law”, Brill, 2013 
Kuner, Ch., European Data Protection Law - Corporate Compliance and Regulation, 
2
nd 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2007  
Lasprogata G./ King N./ Pillay S ., “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: 
Identifying Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy through a Comparative 
Study of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada”, 
Stanford Technology Law Review 4 (2004), pp. 4 et seq.  
Mitrou L., “The General Data Protection Regulation”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in 
Greek) 
Panagopoulou – Koutnagi F., “The General Data Protection Regulation 
679/2016/EU”, Sakoulas Publications, 2017 (in Greek)  
Reijneveld M. D., “Quantified Self, Freedom, and the GDPR”, SCRIPTed: A Journal 
Of Law, Technology and Society, Vol.14 , Issue 2 (December 2017), pp. 285 et seq. 
Safari B. A., “Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR will set a New Global 
Standard for Personal Data Protection”, Secton Hall Law Review, Vol. 47, Issue 3 
(2017), pp. 809 et seq. 
50 
 
Tovino, S., “The HIPPA Privacy Rule and the EU GDPR: Illustrative Comparisons”, 
Seton Hall Law Review, Vol.47, Issue 4 (2017), pp. 973 et seq. 
Zarsky, Z.,”Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data”, Seton Hall Law 
Review, Vol.47, Issue 4 (2017), pp. 973 et seq. 
 
CASE LAW 
510/17/2000 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority  
7/2001 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority, KNoB 50 (2002) 1675,1676 
92/2001 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority, KNoB 50 (2002) 1681 
72/2001 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority, KNoB 50(2002) 1678 
48/2001 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority,  KNoB 50(2002) 1678 
24/2004 decision of the Greek Data Protection Authority, KNoB 52(2004) 683 
C-543/09 Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2011] 
C-92/09 and C-93/09 (Joined Cases) Volker and Markus Schecke GbR/Hartmut Eifert 
v. Land Hessen [2010]  
87/2013 decision of Court of Appeal of Thessaloniki, Armenopoulos 67 (2013)  
 
LEGISLATION  
GDPR 679/2016/EU 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
The Greek Data Protection Law 2472/1997  
 
 
 
